Reproductive division of labor (e.g., germ-soma specialization) is a hallmark of the evolution of multicellularity, signifying the emergence of a new type of individual and facilitating the evolution of increased organismal complexity. A large body of work from evolutionary biology, economics, and ecology has shown that specialization is beneficial when further division of labor produces an accelerating increase in absolute productivity (i.e., productivity is a convex function of specialization). Here we show that reproductive specialization is qualitatively different from classical models of resource sharing, and can evolve even when the benefits of specialization are saturating (i.e., productivity is a concave function of specialization). Through analytical theory and evolutionary individual based simulations, our work demonstrates that reproductive specialization is strongly favored in sparse networks of cellular interactions, such as trees and filaments, that reflect the morphology of early, simple multicellular organisms, highlighting the importance of restricted social interactions in the evolution of reproductive specialization. More broadly, we find that specialization is strongly favored, despite saturating returns on investment, in a wide range of scenarios in which sharing is asymmetric.
Understanding the evolution of cell-cell trade, a classic form 48 of social evolution (30), requires understanding the extent of 49 between-cell interactions. Network theory has proven to be an 50 exceptionally powerful and versatile technique for analyzing 51 social dynamics (31, 32), and indeed, is uniquely well suited to 52 understanding the evolution of early multicellular organisms. 53 When cells adhere through permanent bonds, sparse network-54 like bodies (i.e., filaments and trees) often result. This mode 55
Significance Statement
During the evolution of multicellularity, previously independent cells integrate to form a new organism. A critical step in this major evolutionary transition is the origin of reproductive specialization (e.g., germ-soma differentiation). It is widely thought that complete specialization, like many other types of trade, will only evolve when the payoff from differentiation accelerates with further investment. Here we show that reproductive specialization is a special case of asymmetric trade that is adaptive under a far broader set of conditions, and is particularly promoted in multicellular organisms growing with tree-like topologies. This morphology class readily evolves in nascent multicellular organisms, and appears to be ancestral in most lineages that have evolved complex multicellularity, suggesting a causal role between topology and emergent complexity.
we consider, each individual takes a fraction β of its viability 116 returns and shares that fraction equally among all of its ni 117 neighbors (including itself), and keeps the rest of its returns 118 1 − β for itself. Therefore individual i keeps a total fraction of 119 1 − β + β n i of its returns for itself and gives β n i to each of its 120 non-self neighbors. This means the total amount of returns 121 kept by individual i depends on both the network topology 122 and β. When β = 0 there is no sharing, and when β = 1 123 individuals share everything equally among all connections. 124 We refer to β as interaction strength. A given group topology 125 (unweighted adjacency matrix) and β completely specify c. 126 Within a group of N cells, the overall returns on viability 127 that a given cell enjoys, then, comprises its own returns as 128 well as whatever is shared with it by other members of the 129 group. This can be written asṽi = v α i cii + n j =i v α j cji, or 130 equivalently,ṽi = n j v α j cji. Note that this is a column 131 sum, since it describes the total incoming viability returns an 132 individual receives as a result of toil and trade. Therefore, we 133 write the group level reproduction rate (i.e., the group fitness) 134 for a group of N individuals as
where all three of the above equations are equivalent. We 138 investigate evolutionary outcomes under this definition of 139 group level fitness for groups with different topologies (who 140 shares with whom), and in scenarios with various return on 141 investment exponents α. 142 
Results

143
Fixed resource sharing. We first consider cases wherein cells 144 within a group share across fixed intercellular interactions. 145 Individual i shares v α i equally among interaction and self terms. 146 In each case we vary the return on investment exponent, α, 147 between 0.5 and 1.5, and the interaction strength, β, between 148 0.0 and 1.0, both in increments of 0.1. For each combination 149 of topology, α, and β, the group investment strategy (vi for 150 all i) was allowed to evolve for 1000 generations. 151 We begin with simple topologies: groups with no con-152 nections and groups that are maximally connected. They 153 represent, respectively, the case in which all individuals within 154 the group are autonomous and the case in which every indi-155 vidual interacts with all others (i.e. a 'well-mixed' group). In 156 the absence of interactions, individuals cannot benefit from 157 functions performed by others and therefore must perform 158 both functions v and b; hence specialization is not favored, and 159 does not evolve. In the fully connected case, a high degree of 160 specialization is observed for many values of α and β (Figure 161 1a). Consistent with classic results (6-11), specialization is 162 only achieved in the fully connected case for α > 1. 163 Next, we consider a simple sparse network in which each 164 individual within a group is connected to only two other indi-165 viduals, forming a complete ring ( Figure 1b) ; we refer to this as 166 Fig. 1 . Schematic of topology for a simplified six individual group (first row), and mean specialization as a function of specialization power α and interaction strength β across the entire population. (a) When each individual in the group is connected to all others, specialization is favored only when α > 1. (b) For the nearest neighbor topology, specialization is favorable for a wider range of parameters, including for some values of α < 1. Specifically, specialization is advantageous when α > 3 4β (see Table 1 (c) Connecting alternating specialists creates a bipartite graph which maximizes the benefits of specialization and the range of parameters for which it is advantageous. In this case specialization is favorable wherever α > 3 5β . The red curves represent analytical predictions for α * , the lowest value of α for which complete generalization is disfavored, and the orange vertical lines are at α = 1 to guide the eye. While analysis shows that some degree of specialization must occur in the regime upward and to the right of the red curves, simulations reveal that when complete generalization is disfavored complete specialization is favored in these networks.
the neighbor network. Surprisingly, preventing trade between 167 most individuals encourages division of labor. We find that 168 specialization evolves even when α < 1.0, i.e., when the returns 169 on investment are saturating or concave. In our simulations, 170 this topology leads to alternating specialists in viability and 171 fecundity ( Figure 1b ). Analytically, we find that this topology 172 always favors at least some degree of specialization whenever 173 α > 3 4β .
174
We next study a network with individuals that can be Figure 1 ) suggest 195 that when complete generalization is not a fitness maximum, 196 a high degree of (or even complete) specialization typically 197 does maximize fitness.
198
In all cases in which complete specialization is achieved in 199 evolutionary simulations, the self-fitness terms of the viability 200 specialists go to zero, as they cannot reproduce on their own. 201 Thus, for both fixed and evolved resource sharing, we observe 221 specialization for the largest range of parameters (including 222 α < 1) not when the group is maximally connected, but rather 223 when connections are fairly sparse. Therefore, a sparse group 224 topology readily constitutes a cooperation-prone physical sub-225 strate that can sustain evolvability of specialization traits.
226
As an example of the benefit of evolving sharing, consider 227 that the maximum fitness according to eq. 1 for a group of 228 N disconnected individuals scales as N 1 2 2α . On the other 229 hand, for a bipartite network with a complete specialization 230 strategy (i.e. v = 0, 1, 0, 1, ... ), the fitness scales as N 2 β 2N +2 .
231
The ratio of these fitnesses is
the approximation is for large N . So for larger groups and 233 when α > 1 2 − log β 2 log 2 , if a group can evolve resource sharing (i.e.
234
letting β → 1 and adopting the specialist investment strategy) 235 its maximum fitness will increase.
236
Benefit of specialization. We now consider another concrete 237 example to highlight the benefit of specialization. For special-238 ization to be favored, its emergence must result in a higher 239 fitness for the group. To show how this is achieved despite sat-240 urating returns, we consider groups of four, connected via the 241 nearest-neighbor topology (i.e., in a ring). We directly calcu-242 late the fitness of generalists and specialists for two scenarios: 243 α = 0.9 and α = 1. By summing the fitness contributions of 244 each member, we can calculate the relative fitness of general-245 ists and specialists, and thus determine whether specialization 246 will be favored ( Figure 2 ).
247
In this simple scenario, reproductive specialization strongly 248 increases group fitness (33% for α = 1 and 22% for α = 249 0.9), suggesting an advantage may be found in many systems, 250 even those that are considerably less optimal than the one 251 considered here. For example, real interactions have costs (e.g.,
252
transport costs, loss of shared product, etc.); reproductive 253 division of labor would still be favored as long as those costs 254 do not exceed the benefit of specialization.
255
The benefit of specialization in ring networks increases For the case of generalists (a), each individual receives as much viability as it shares, and all nodes contribute equally to the fitness of the group. Therefore, the fitness of the group is W = 4 · 1 2 · 1 2 = 1. For the case of specialists, however. the viability specialist individuals (blue) have 0 fitness, while the fecundity specialist individuals have nonzero fitness contributions due to the fact that they receive 1 3 of each viability specialist's output. Thus the fitness of the group is W = 2(2 · 1 3 ) = 4 3 . Thus fitness is higher for the group of specialists, so specialization is favored. For α = 0.9, the fitness of generalists is 1.15, and the fitness of specialists is 1.39. Thus, even though the returns on investment are saturating (i.e., concave), specialization is favored.
, the ring of complete specialists enjoys a greater 260 fitness than the ring of complete generalists. Again, note that 261 complete generalization becomes disfavored when α > 3 4β , so 262 there is a narrow regime where 3 4β < α < log 3−log β 2 log 2 during 263 which neither complete generalization nor complete special-264 ization is optimal. Numerical optimization and evolutionary 265 simulations suggest that even in this region, however, the 266 specialization score of the optimal strategy is large ( Figure 1 ). 267 While these particular topologies do favor specialization even 268 when α < 1, we find that the emergence of specialization under 269 these conditions is quite robust to choice of group topology.
270
Effect of sparsity. Surprisingly, saturating specialization ap-271 pears to be the rule, rather than the exception, for sparsely con-272 nected graphs. We investigated Erdős-Rényi random graphs 273 with varying degrees of connectivity to systematically exam-274 ine the relationship between sparsity and the value of α at 275 which specialization is favored. We find that many randomly 276 assembled graphs obtain maximum fitness through complete 277 reproductive specialization even when α is below 1 (Figure 3 278 b,c). It is only at the extremes of sparsity and connectivity 279 (near the fully connected or fully unconnected points) that 280 generalists maintain superior fitness for all values of α < 1. We 281 further show that this general trend is independent of the size 282 of a group; saturating specialization is favorable for groups of 283 size N = 10, N = 100, and N = 1000. When network connec-284 tivity is at its minimum, the group consists solely of isolated 285 individuals that cannot interact. Under these conditions gen-286 eralists are favored. Similarly, at maximum connectivity every 287 individual interacts with every other individual. Under these 288 conditions generalists are favored unless αβ > 1. However, 289 when connectivity is small but not zero, specialization arises 290 most readily. We conjecture that the troughs in Figure 3 c, 291 where specialization occurs for the lowest values of α, occur 292 when connectivity is just large enough so that a spanning tree 293 is more likely to connect all individuals in the group than not. 294 the Hessian evaluated at v = 1 2 1 stops being negative definite, i.e. α * ; dotted lines indicate roughly where the simulation curves cross specialization of 0.5, i.e. the "true" transition value of α where specialization becomes favored. (c) To further explore trees and filaments we analytically solved for α * for various types of trees and filaments of different sizes. α * is plotted versus group size for several topologies. This is a proxy measure of how amenable a network structure is to specialization. optimal strategy. However, even for groups where the number 322 of neighbors for each cell varies, we can still use α * as a proxy 323 for how amenable a topology is to saturating specialization. 324 The smaller α * , the more specialization is likely to be favored. 325 We plot vertical lines where α = α * (solid green fig 4(a) and 326 blue fig 4(b) ), and dotted lines to indicate roughly where the 327 simulation curves cross specialization of 0.5. This shows that 328 using α * as an overall metric for how amenable a network is to 329 saturating specialization is a reasonable approach-at least 330 in this case. This metric α * only depends on topology and 331 can in principle be calculated analytically given any network. 332 We examined the value of α * as filaments and a variety of 333 tree-like structures grow larger, and find that specialization 334 becomes more strongly favored (Figure 4c ). While group size 335 has no effect on specialization for some topologies, like the 336 primarily composed of linear chains of cells.
392
The main difference between our work and previous inves-393 tigations of the effect of group topology on specialization is 394 that we consider the productivity of groups as a whole, not 395 the individuals within them, and we consider situations of 396 highly asymmetric sharing. Our approach is general, and can 397 be applied to other systems of trade and specialization, so long 398 as 1) only the aggregate productivity of the group (and not 399 the individuals within it) is maximized, 2) the productivity of 400 each individual within the group is a multiplicative function of 401 returns on investment into two (or more) tasks, and 3) there 402 is an asymmetry in how products of those investments are 403 shared. While in this work we have focused on reproductive 404 division of labor, a process in which fecundity returns are 405 not shared at all, we show in the supplement that as long as 406 sharing of two goods is sufficiently asymmetric, specialization 407 with saturating returns on investment can still be adaptive 408 (Supplemental Figure 2) .
409
Conclusion 410 We explored the evolution of reproductive specialization in 411 multicellular groups with various cellular interaction topolo-412 gies. Our results demonstrate that group topological structure 413 can play a key role in the evolution of reproductive division 414 of labor. Indeed, within a broad class of sparsely connected 415 networks, specialization is favored even when the returns from 416 cooperation are saturating (i.e., concave); this result is in 417 direct contrast to the prevailing view that accelerating (i.e., 418 convex), returns are required for natural selection to favor 419 increased specialization (6-11). Our results underscore the 420 central importance of life history trade-offs in the origin of mul-421 ticellularity (7, 10, 64-66), broadening the conditions under 422 which they can drive the evolution of complete reproductive 423 specialization. Our results support the emerging consensus 424 that evolutionary transitions in individuality are not necessar-425 ily highly constrained (4, 43, 47, 65, 67-72).
426
Methods
427
Analysis. The gradient of the fitness with respect to the group 428 investment strategy v, is
whereê k is a unit vector in the k th direction. First notice 431 that if c = c T , and v = 1 2 1 where 1 is a vector of ones, 432 then the gradient is zero. This strategy, v = 1 2 1, corresponds 433 to the 'generalist' approach, where every individual invests 434 equally into both tasks. Call it the generalist strategy. Second, 435 notice that if c = c T then the gradient is not zero under the 436 generalist strategy, so at least some degree of specialization 437 must be necessary to maximize fitness. To determine the 438 stability of this solution we examine H * , the Hessian (see 439 SI eq. 6) evaluated at the generalist critical point. If H * 440 is negative definite, then the generalist strategy is a fitness 441 maximum and is therefore an optimal strategy. If, on the 442 other hand, H * has both positive and negative eigenvalues 443 then the generalist strategy lies at a saddle point within the 444 fitness landscape, and therefore the optimal strategy must be 445 somewhere else in (or on the boundary of) the domain (i.e. 446 vi ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ 1, 2, ...N ) . Finally, note that H * is never 447 positive definite since 1 is always an eigenvector with negative eigenvalue (when c = c T ). strategy-the one which maximizes the fitness-we introduce 476 the following metric, which we refer to simply as "Specializa- 
whereê k is a unit vector in the k th direction.
649
Hessian. The Hessian ∂ 2 W ∂v k ∂v is
[6] 651 Of particular interest for us is the value of the Hessian at 652 the generalist strategy when c = c T . In that case
where a is the row-normalized adjacency matrix of the 655 network. If A is the network's adjacency matrix then
The case when c = c T . As noted above, when c = c T , the 657 generalist strategy is always a critical point where ∂W ∂ v = 0. 658 To determine the stability of this solution we examine H * (eq. 659 7). If H * is negative definite, then the generalist strategy is a 660 fitness maximum and is therefore an optimal strategy. If, on 661 the other hand, H * has both positive and negative eigenvalues 662 then the generalist strategy lies at a saddle point within the 663 fitness landscape, and therefore the optimal strategy must be 664 somewhere else in (or on the boundary of) the domain (i.e. 665 vi ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ 1, 2, ...N ). Finally, note that H * is never 666 positive definite (when c = c T ). Consider H * 1:
We have a 1 = 1 since a is row-normalized. Furthermore, 668 α > 0, so 1 is always an eigenvector of H * with a negative 669 eigenvalue. 670 We can next ask, under what conditions is H * negative 671 definite? This will depend on the group topology, the nonlinear 672 returns on investment α, and the interaction strength β. We 673 examine three cases: the ring graph, the bipartite graph, and 674 the complete graph.
675
When c = c T , the matrix H * is a special type of matrix 676 called a circulant matrix, with well known properties. Its 677 eigenvalues are given by the discrete Fourier transform of its 678 first row. The k th eigenvalue is
For the ring topology with N = 10, for example Here, the mean specialization of the fittest of 100 10-individual groups after 100,000 steps is plotted function of specialization power. Shading is standard deviation across 10 replicates. Blue is the complete network, red is the nearest-neighbor network, and green is the specialization-optimized topology.
which yields the following Hessian at the generalist critical 720 point (for the ring, bipartite, and complete networks). Where, as above, A is the graph's adjacency matrix (in-725 cluding self loops). 726 We see that for a given topology the adjacency matrix 727 is fixed, so that c1 and c2 differ only in their functional 728 interaction strengths β1 and β2. Therefore the maximum 729 fitness strategy, specified by the vector v * , for a given group 730 will depend under our model on the following parameters: Interestingly, specialization is favored when one resource is shared liberally while the other resource is shared sparingly (though it is not necessary to have one resource remain totally unshared).
We demonstrate the effect of these parameters on the op-732 timal strategy by finding the minimum value of α for which 733 specialization becomes favored, which we denote the crossover 734 α * , for a given pair (β1, β2) and given topology. The results 735 are shown in figure 2.
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